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1 Introduction
The high prevalence of informality is a well-known characteristic of
labor markets in developing countries.1 Informal work is by nature
heterogeneous. It includes self-employed individuals, as well as those
working under them (often a few family members and friends). It
also extends to those employed by larger organizations but who are
not effectively covered by any of the institutions –such as the pension
system and other social insurance– that protect formal employees.
While for the most part the economic activities of informal workers
are legal, they are often not taken into account in official statistics,
and much of the income they generate goes untaxed.
An important undecided issue is to what extent informality is a
variable of choice. Do individuals choose to participate in the informal
sector based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits? Or are
informal workers better characterized as victims of a poverty trap? In
this paper I provide evidence that supports the thesis that a majority
of informal employment is the result of a choice.
My empirical strategy is based on the intuition that, if informal-
ity is a voluntary state, changes in the economic environment should
lead to an observable response in participation decisions. Specifically,
lower taxation rates should reduce individuals’ incentives to enter the
informal sector. In order to document the causal effect of the level of
taxation on informality I focus on an event that exogenously reduced
tax rates for a well defined group of individuals while leaving others
mostly unaffected.
In 2001, Russia introduced a tax reform that drastically reduced
taxation levels and simplified the process of filing taxes. The pre-
reform progressive personal income tax rates were replaced by a ‘flat’
and low rate of 13%. Payroll taxes were also affected. Before the
1In many Latin American countries, the share of informal employment exceeds
50% of the urban labor force (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2007). Existing estimates
for Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are even higher (Ju¨tting et al., 2008).
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reform, employers had to make contributions –adding up to 38.5% of
the gross salary– to four different social funds. Starting in 2001, these
contributions were unified into a single social tax with a regressive
scale. If lower levels of taxation causally affect informality, then such
a comprehensive tax reform should have had a measurable impact.
I exploit the fact that the reform greatly reduced tax rates for up-
per income brackets but left lower brackets almost unaffected, thereby
creating well-defined treatment and control groups. The effect of the
tax reform on informality can be estimated following a differences-in-
differences strategy. Intuitively, the differences in differences estimator
captures the post-reform average drop in the probability of participat-
ing in the informal sector experienced by the treatment group relative
to the control group. I interpret a statistically and economically sig-
nificant negative estimate as evidence that the reduction in tax rates
caused many individuals to choose to exit the informal sector. Specif-
ically, I find that, after controlling for observable characteristics and
individual fixed effect, employed individuals who were affected by the
tax reform were on average 2.5% less likely to be informal employees
and 4% less likely to perform informal irregular activities.2 On the
extensive margin, I find that individuals who were not-employed right
before the reform and found a job in its aftermath were also less likely
to be informally employed.
The debate around the causes of informality has a long history.
Since the early contributions to the literature in the 1970s to the
present, there have been two main theories of how and why the in-
formal sector develops.3 According to the segmented labor markets
view, the urban informal sector is for the most part comprised of mi-
grants from urban areas who failed to secure a formal position in the
modern sector. Labor market segmentation occurs because of rigidi-
2As I explain below, these estimates should be interpreted as lower bounds. I
find no evidence that the tax reform affected informal entrepreneurs or informality
in the second job. See table 8.
3For clarity of exposition I focus on the extreme cases. Fields (2005) suggests
labor markets in developing countries probably have elements of both theories.
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ties that prevent wages in the formal sector from falling in response
to excess supply.4 In turn, it is typically assumed that there is a po-
tentially infinite supply of labor originating in the traditional rural
sector. The only available adjustment mechanism is for firms to limit
the quantity of formal employment to the point where the marginal
product of labor equals the mandated minimum wage. Those who are
rationed out of the formal segment have the opportunity to take a job
in the (free entry) informal sector. The distinctive characteristic of
this view is that self-employment and other forms of informal employ-
ment are seen as unconditionally worse than formal jobs. Workers
only accept informality as a survival strategy while queueing up for
a position in the modern sector. As long as the wage in the modern
sector is kept artificially high, however, people in rural areas continue
to find it worthwhile to migrate to the city, and the share of informal
employment keeps growing.
This pessimistic interpretation of the informal sector came under
review after the publication of De Soto’s (1990) book, which argued
that informality is a rational response to the labyrinth of useless state
regulations and permits required to do business in developing coun-
tries. In this alternative view, labor markets are well-integrated (as
opposed to segmented) and hence informal jobs must be, at the mar-
gin, not inferior to formal sector positions. The formal-informal dis-
tinction is one between alternative bundles of characteristics including
income levels, risk, taxation and regulation intensity, access (or lack
of access) to public goods, and non-monetary aspects such as “being
one’s own boss”, “working for an important firm/brand”, etc. Accord-
ing to this view, those who choose self-employment and other forms of
informal work are doing the best they can given their endowments and
preferences. They should be seen as individuals full of entrepreneurial
spirit and skills and not as excluded or disadvantaged.
4For example, in the influential Harris-Todaro (1970) model there is a minimum
wage that is enforced only in the formal urban sector. Other rigidities –an urban
trade union in Calvo (1978), for example– lead to similar results.
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To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study that attempts
to test the competing theories by studying a natural experiment like
the Russian tax reform.5 Previous work has, however, provided some
evidence favoring the integrated markets hypothesis. First, average
earnings of self-employed individuals are typically higher than those
of formal salaried workers.6 Moreover, once longitudinal data became
available in developing countries it was possible to document that
workers moving out of self-employment and into formal employment
faced, on average, a significant decline in remuneration (and viceversa
for those going from formal positions into self-employment). A higher
monetary remuneration for the self-employed is prima facie hard to
reconcile with the segmented labor markets story. However, because
benefits and other non-monetary aspects of the job are generally un-
observable, it is not possible to draw any hard conclusions from these
earnings differentials. Moreover, the earnings of formal sector work-
ers are typically higher than those of informal workers other than the
self-employed, so the evidence is not unambiguous even if monetary
figures are taken at face value.
Second, the analysis of the relative frequency of transitions in and
out of different employment statuses does not seem to hold up well
with the idea that informal workers are queueing up for formal sector
jobs. In fact, transitions in and out of formal sector positions seem
to be roughly as frequent as those in and out of self-employment and
other forms of informal employment.7 While this evidence is some-
what persuasive, it is liable to the criticism that transitions across
sectors might be systematically different from transitions within the
5Using a similar methodology, Ivanova et al. (2005) and Gorodnichenko et al.
(2009) documented positive effects of the reform on public revenue and tax com-
pliance at the household level but did not address the issue of informality in the
labor market.
6This is specially true of self-employed professionals. See Gasparini and
Tornarolli (2007).
7See Maloney (1999, 2004) for evidence on Latin American countries. Using
a similar methodology, Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) find mixed evidence in the
case of Ukraine.
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informal sector. For example, high transition probabilities between
formal and informal positions could be simply due to firms in the for-
mal sector conducting evaluations of their workers’ performance rel-
atively more frequently. It is not necessarily true that high turnover
between the formal and the informal sectors implies absence of entry
barriers. This kind of objection cannot be raised against the differ-
ences in differences estimates presented below. Moreover, as I show in
section six below, while prima facie transition data does not favor the
integrated markets hypothesis, a closer analysis that separates tran-
sitions by individuals in the treatment and control groups is clearly
supportive of it.
Although I focus on informal employment, this paper is also closely
related to the burgeoning literature on the determinants of the size
of the unofficial economy. The unofficial –also called shadow, hidden
or underground– economy refers to the production, whether legal or
illegal, of goods and services for the market that escapes detection in
the official estimates of GDP (Schneider and Enste, 2000). While the
definition and the units of measurement of informal employment are
different, in practice there is a strong overlap between the two con-
cepts since a large proportion of informal work is probably not regis-
tered in official statistics and viceversa. Moreover, as with informal
employment, one widely accepted interpretation is that underground
economic activity is a response to excessive involvement of the State
in the economy in the form of intrusive regulations and high levels
of taxation. Among post-communist countries, there is evidence that
only those which succeeded in limiting the political control of eco-
nomic activity (at the same time as they improved the provision of
key public goods necessary for the good functioning of markets) seem
to have managed to keep the growth of the unofficial economy under
control (Johnson et al., 1997, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).
Modern Russia seems like a perfect illustration of the theory link-
ing excessive government intervention and the shadow economy. Rus-
sian managers face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic cor-
ruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in
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the court system than their peers in Slovakia, Poland and Romania,
and that seems to go some way into explaining why Russia’s under-
ground economy is relatively larger (Johnson et al., 2000). Also, Rus-
sia inherited an unregulated sector from the Soviet times. Grossman
(1977) coined the term “second economy” for the set of illegal and
quasi-legal economic activities that individuals engaged in to put up
with or exploit the severe rationing of goods and services under com-
munism. Such activities encompassed the cultivation of small plots
of land, simple stealing from state enterprises, speculation, illicit pro-
duction at secondary occupations, and many others. In 1990, almost
15% of personal income of workers and employees had informal sources
(Kim, 2003). In other words, the incipient Russian market economy
inherited the ability to avoid regulation by the state when such regula-
tion is too costly or otherwise excessive (Gerxhani, 2004, Guariglia and
Kim, 2006). Using different methods and definitions, several studies
have documented a rising share of the underground activity in Russia
during the 1990s (Lacko, 2000).8
There are, however, reasons to believe that the statistical asso-
ciation between excessive regulation and a growing unofficial sector
is not causal. Firms might decide to operate underground mainly in
order to avoid predatory behavior by government officials rather than
regulations per se (Johnson et al., 1998). If that is the case, then
it is not so much the letter of the law –for example mandating high
taxes– that influences informality but rather the discretional authority
of administrative officials in the context of a corrupt administrative
system. To the extent that informal employment is a good proxy for
unofficial activities, my estimates of the effect of the tax reform can
also be interpreted as a test of the theory that the shadow economy
is a response to excessive regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to
the definition of informal employment and how it can be implemented
8These estimates put the size of hidden economy in the order of 40% of official
Russian GDP.
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given the available data. In section three I present a descriptive anal-
ysis of informal workers in Russia using alternative data sources. Sec-
tion four focuses on the structure of the tax reform and the definition
of the treatment and control groups. Section five presents the main
results for the intensive and extensive margins, as well as a number of
robustness checks. In section six I conduct an analysis of transition
probabilities. Section seven concludes.
2 Informality Definition and Measurement
The main data source for this study is the Russian Longitudinal Mon-
itoring Survey (RLMS). In this section I briefly describe the RLMS
and discuss my working definition of informal employment.
2.1 Data and Variables
The RLMS is a household panel survey based on the first national
probability sample drawn in the Russian Federation.9. I use data from
rounds VIII–XVIII of phase II of the RLMS, covering the period 1998–
2009.10 In a typical round, 10,000 individuals in 4,000 households
are interviewed. These individuals reside in 32 oblasts (regions) and
7 federal districts of the Russian Federation. A series of questions
about the household (referred to as the “family questionnaire”) are
answered by one householder selected as the reference person. In turn,
9The RLMS is conducted by the Higher School of Economics and the “Demo-
scope” team in Russia, together with Carolina Population Center, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
10Phase II started in 1994 and has been conducted annually thereafter, with the
exception of the years 1997 and 1999. In RLMS parlance the first round of phase II
is referred to as “round V” (this is because phase I comprised four rounds). While
every round of the RLMS is designed to be nationally representative, phase I and
phase II cannot be combined for longitudinal analysis. Questions on informality
were not asked until round VIII.
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each adult in the household is interviewed individually (the “adult
questionnaire”).
The adult questionnaire includes questions regarding a primary
and a secondary job. In addition, individuals are also asked whether
they perform what I will refer to as “irregular remunerated activities”.
The exact phrasing of the questionnaire item is as follows: “Tell me,
please: in the last 30 days did you engage in some additional kind
of work for which you were paid or will be paid? Maybe you sewed
someone a dress, gave someone a ride in a car, assisted someone with
apartment or car repairs, purchased and delivered food, looked after a
sick person, sold purchased food or goods in a market or on the street,
or did something else that you were paid for?” The questionnaire
structure is such that no one may answer questions on a secondary job
unless they have a primary job. However, questions on the irregular
activities are independent.11
Figure 1 shows the employment and the unemployment rate, ac-
cording to the RLMS and the standard labor force survey conducted
by ROSTAT. While the two data sources display some minor discrep-
ancies12, all series show that the period under analysis was –at least
labor market wise– one of relative economic prosperity and stability.
In order to gain further insight into the meaningfulness of my infor-
mality variables, I also make use of a special supplement of questions
on informal work (INFSUP13) that was added to the RLMS adult
interview in 2009 (round XVIII). The INFSUP questionnaire was ad-
ministered to all employed individuals after the regular interviews had
11In fact, 8.5% of those considered employed only work doing irregular activities.
12The ROSTAT labor force survey counts any form of work, including barter,
as employment. It also asks employment-related questions regarding a reference
week, while the RLMS asks about activities during the last month.
13The INFSUP was designed and financed by the Center for Labor Market
Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and the Labor Markets
in Emerging and Transition Economies Research Program at IZA in Germany. I
thank Vladimir Gimpelson and Hartmut Lehmann for generously making these
data available.
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Figure 1 – Employment and Unemployment Rates
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII and ROSTAT labor force survey (1998–2009).
been completed.14
2.2 Definition of Informal Employment
As has been clearly put in a recent book-length study by the World
Bank: “The term informality means different things to different peo-
ple, but almost always bad things: unprotected workers, excessive
regulation, low productivity, unfair competition, evasion of the rule of
law, underpayment or nonpayment of taxes, and work ‘underground’
or in the shadows.” (Perry et al., 2007) The idea of the informal sector
was originally adopted and popularized by economic anthropologist
Keith Hart (1973) and a series of studies sponsored by the Interna-
tional Labour Office (ILO, 1972). Since the beginning, the concept
was meant to comprise heterogenous labor practices including petty
14In rare opportunities, the INFSUP was administered on a later date than the
regular questionnaire, although always by the same interviewer.
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trading, self-employment of different sorts, own-account professionals,
family workers, and other forms of non-standard (from a Western per-
spective) work prevalent in developing countries. Moreover, many of
the initial bounds of the concept were eventually trespassed in one
way or another. For example, while the informal sector was originally
thought to be predominantly urban, it was quickly accepted that it
should also include some forms of small-scale agricultural work. De-
spite these ambiguities –and partly thanks to them– the concept has
proved useful to researchers with a wide range of interests.15
While the literature widely recognizes the blurry bounds of the
concept, there are two most commonly used definitions of informal-
ity. On the one hand, the so called ‘productive’ definition focuses
on a number of characteristics of the production unit (Hussmanns,
2004). First, informal sector enterprises typically include only private
unincorporated units, i.e. enterprises not constituted as separate le-
gal entities independently of their owners. Second, at least part of the
goods or services they produce is meant for sale or barter. Lastly, their
scale of operations is assumed to be very small. In fact, when better
data is lacking, informal enterprises are often defined as those whose
size in terms of employment is below a given threshold (typically less
than 5 employees).
On the other hand, the ‘legalistic’ or social protection definition
focuses on the status of workers in relation to labor law and the so-
cial safety net. It measures to what extent workers are effectively
–as opposed to only de jure– protected by labor market institutions.
Informal sector employment occurs in cases of noncompliance to the
State in terms of labor regulations and the social security system.
15There are numerous reviews of the literature on the informal sector and in-
formal employment. See for example: Peattie (1987), Swaminathan (1991), and
Ju¨tting et al. (2008).
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In this paper I use both legalistic and productive criteria to de-
termine if an individual is informally employed. Table 1 shows a
schematic representation of the different employment types and my
working definition of informality in each case. Throughout the pa-
per, I analyze informality at the main job, the secondary job and the
remunerated irregular activities separately.
At the main job, I start by distinguishing between entrepreneurs
and employees. The former group is composed of those doing en-
trepreneurial activities who are either owners of firms or self-employed
individuals who work on their own account with or without employ-
ees but not at a firm or organization.16 Following the productive
definition, those not working at firms or organizations are considered
informal. For those working at firms or organizations, the RLMS ques-
tionnaire includes an item that permits determining whether they are
registered, i.e. working officially.17 The Russian labor code mandates
that all employees sign a written contract and deposit their ‘labor
book’ with the employer. Therefore, following the social protection
criterion, I classify unregistered entrepreneurs and employees as infor-
mal.
Some firms in Russia register their employees but declare a ficti-
tious salary that is lower than the real amount in order to reduce the
16This classification is based on four items of the adult questionnaire: 1) “do
you work at an enterprise or organization? We mean any organization or enter-
prise where more than one person works, no matter if it is private or state-owned.
For example, any establishment, factory, firm, collective farm, state farm, farm-
ing industry, store, army, government service, or other organization.” Enterprise
workers are considered entrepreneurs if they answer positively to both 2) “Are you
personally an owner or co-owner of the enterprise where you work?” and 3) “In
your opinion, are you doing entrepreneurial work at this job?”. The distinction
between entrepreneurs and employees for non-enterprise individuals is based on:
4) “At this job are you...(a) involved in an employer’s or individual labor activity
or (b) work for a private individual?”
17The question is: “Tell me, please: are you employed in this job officially, in
other words, by labor book, labor agreement, or contract?” This item was not
included in round X (2001).
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base of payroll and other taxes. The difference between the declared
and the real salary is settled with an “envelope payment” at the end
of the month. If such a practice were widespread, the registration
criterion could err on the side of underestimating the extent of infor-
mality. Fortunately, the 2009 round of the RLMS included an item on
envelope payments, which I use below to show that this is probably
not an important reason for concern.
While using the productive definition to classify all self-employed
individuals and their employees as informal is standard practice, it
would be reassuring if the social protection criterion could be applied
as well. Unfortunately, a limitation of the RLMS data is that non-
enterprise individuals are not asked about registration, so it is not
possible to apply the legalistic definition to them.18 However, thanks
to the INFSUP we have some good indication of the extent to which
self-employed individuals comply with the regulations. As I show
below, the level of compliance is quite low, so choosing between the
legalistic and productive definition does not make a big difference for
these workers. The supplementary questions also confirm that there
is a high correlation between lack of registration and other forms of
non-compliance with labor regulations.
In principle, the RLMS questionnaire contains enough detail to
treat the main and the second job symmetrically. However, the num-
ber of observations would not be large enough for a meaningful statis-
tical analysis of the resulting sub-categories. For example, only about
40 individuals per round do entrepreneurial activities in the second
job. Therefore, a single category of informal work in the second job is
considered, consisting of those unregistered19 plus those not working
for a firm or organization.
18Russian law does not require self-employed individuals to create a corporation
or special legal entity. They are instead allowed to operate under a special and
simpler registration procedure. However, the obligation to sign a written contract
and register employees applies to all employers without exception.
19The registration question for the second job is identical to that in the primary
job. It was also not included in round X.
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Figure 2 – Informality at Main Job: employees and entrepreneurs
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). The series are defined as a percentage of those with a
main job.
Finally, I consider remunerated irregular activities. Based on the
productive definition, all employment of this kind could be classified as
informal. However, since not much information is available regarding
these activities I only consider them informal if the respondent gives a
negative answer to the question: “Tell me, were you employed in this
job officially, for example by an agreement, an official contract, or a
license?”20 This methodological decision is unlikely to affect results21
since almost 87% of irregular work is done without a contract.
According to these definitions, figures 2 and 3 show the evolution
of informal employment participation rates over the period and pro-
20This item is available in every round.
21In table 9 I show that this distinction does not affect the main results. Sim-
ilarly, one could distinguish between those whose only remunerated work are ir-
regular activities and those for whom irregular activities are supplementary. This
distinction does not affect results either.
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Figure 3 – Informality at Second Job and Remunerated Irregular Activities
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). The series for the second job are defined as a percentage
of those with a main job. For the irregular activities, the base are all those employed.
vide some preliminary evidence on the likely effects of the tax reform.
First, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the main job –both formal and
informal– has remained stable at around 4.5%. Second, informality
among employees has risen almost uninterruptedly and toward the
end of the period is well into the double digits. Eyeballing the time
series suggests the tax reform might have caused a deceleration of the
rate of growth of informal employment in the short run. However,
no long run effect is apparent. Third, the percentage of second job
holders of any kind has also not changed much during these 11 years.
Informality in the second job is relatively uncommon. Finally, prima
facie there seems to be a strong negative effect of the tax reform on
the prevalence of irregular activities, informal or otherwise. This is
important since, at least until the reform was implemented, irregular
activities were the most important form of informal work in Russia.
However, simple before-after comparisons are risky. Figure 4 presents
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Figure 4 – Real Hourly Earnings
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Real hourly earnings are monthly receipts divided by
usual hours and deflated by the CPI. Informal irregular activities exclusive means that the individual
held no other job.
the evolution of real hourly wages for workers in the formal and infor-
mal sector. Real incomes were increasing over the period and, to the
extent that a growing economy induces formalization, it might well be
the case that the tax reform had very little to do with the downward
trend in informal irregular activities after 2001. On the other hand,
if what matters are relative rewards between the formal and infor-
mal sector, then it seems unlikely that the modest changes in relative
wages shown in the figure might explain quantitatively large sectoral
shifts.
18
3 Description of Informal Employment in Rus-
sia
While my working definition of informality has many antecedents22,
it is also somewhat idiosyncratic to the extent that the questionnaire
items of the RLMS are unique and that not much is known about the
informal sector in modern Russia. There could be legitimate concerns
regarding to what extent what is being measured corresponds to the
concept of informality.
Fortunately, some insight can be gained thanks to the wealth of
information in the regular RLMS survey and in the INFSUP. In this
section, I show that workers that are informal according to my defi-
nition have many of the characteristics found in other studies. I also
present evidence that alternative definitions, while reasonable, would
probably not affect the results.
3.1 Demographics
Table 2 provides demographic information on informal workers in Rus-
sia toward the end of 2009. The table confirms many of the empirical
regularities observed in other countries. For example, informal em-
ployees tend to be low skill. Only around 12% of them has a college
degree and their level of schooling is below that of the average Russian
worker. They are also relatively younger, predominantly male and less
experienced. Workers performing informal irregular activities23 seem
to show many of the same characteristics, although a larger share of
them live in rural areas and belong to one of the many ethnic minori-
ties.
22For example, Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) use a similar definition for Ukraine.
For a discussion of the relative merits of alternative definitions, see Swaminathan
(1991) and Portes and Schauﬄer (1993).
23Because I analyze informality in each of the three possible jobs separately,
some individuals are counted under more than one category.
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Table 2 – Background Characteristics of Informal Workers in Russia
All
Employed
Inf.
Em-
ployee
Inf.
Entrepr.
Inf. Sec.
Job
Inf.
Irreg.
Activ
Female 0.54 0.49 0.42 0.56 0.45
Age 39.5 36.4 40.1 38.9 38.6
College Degree 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.28 0.15
Schooling (Yrs) 12.3 11.5 12.1 12.5 11.4
Experience 14.3 9.2 14.4 14.8 11.3
Married 0.51 0.42 0.66 0.48 0.42
Urban Location 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.88 0.63
Russian National 0.87 0.86 0.77 0.86 0.81
Russian Born 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.87 0.92
Size HH 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.0 3.4
“After Tax” Income
This Job (rubles) 13,194 11,043 18,661 7,142 7,043
% Reported for Tax 86.6 32.0 62.9 NA NA
All Jobs (rubles) 13,446 11,132 18,878 17,024 12,470
Obs 7192 815 204 158 583
Notes: The data source is RLMS, round XVIII (2009). Employed workers are those with a job or
who do remunerated irregular activities. Informal employees are those who work for a self-employed
individual or who work for a firm or organization but are not registered. Informal entrepreneurs are
either self-employed or owners of a firm who do entrepreneurial activities but are not registered.
Informal second job includes both informal employees and informal entrepreneurs in their second
job, regardless of the main job status. Informal irregular activities are other remunerated activities
conducted without formal contracting.
As in other countries, individual entrepreneurs in Russia are rel-
atively well off. While they are less educated than average workers,
their qualifications are not as low as those of informal employees. En-
trepreneurs are also relatively more likely to marry and form a family.
Individuals who participate in the informal sector through a sec-
ondary job also have higher than average incomes. In almost all other
respects, however, they are difficult to distinguish from the average
worker.
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The 2009 round of the RLMS included an item on “envelope pay-
ments”.24 Formal employees answered that 92% of their earnings were
reported to tax authorities. In turn, informal employees and individ-
ual entrepreneurs confessed having payed taxes on a significantly lower
fraction of earning. While responses to such sensitive issues cannot
be taken at face value, the high correlation between informality and
declared tax avoidance is reassuring.
Tables 14 and 15 in the appendix show that informal workers over-
whelmingly belong to unskilled and service occupations, and work in
the trade and construction industries. This is consistent with the idea
that informal workers work in occupations/industries with low bar-
riers to entry –i.e. requiring almost no start-up capital or specific
knowledge.
3.2 Job Characteristics
The standard RLMS survey offers some detailed information regard-
ing the characteristics of the job25, which I present in table 3. In-
formal employees have relatively weak attachment to the job. While
their observed average tenure is quite low, the probability of transi-
tion implies an even lower26 average job duration (1/(1− 0.35) ≈ 1.5
years). Informal second jobs seem to have short durations too. While
we lack information regarding average duration of irregular activities,
over 66% of workers answered affirmatively to a specific item asking
whether these activities were “incidental”. Interestingly, however, this
is not the case with informal entrepreneurs, who have below average
24Specifically, after the regular earnings item for the main job, the questionnaire
asked: “what percent of that money do you think was officially registered, i.e.
taxes were paid?” No similar question was included for the other jobs.
25For the second job, some questions were not included in round XVIII. I then
report information from the most recent round when the item was available. See
the notes at the bottom of the table for data sources.
26The reason is that some outliers push the average up. Median observed tenure
for informal employees is 1.27 years.
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transition probabilities.
Table 3 – Job Characteristics for Informal Workers in Russia
All
Employed
Informal
Employee
Informal
Entrepr.
Informal
Sec. Job
Tenure (Yrs) 7.3 2.8 7.2 2.5\
Changed Jobs 0.16 0.35 0.13 NA
Changed Occupation 0.11 0.21 0.06 NA
Has Subordinates 0.20 0.08 0.38 0.10[
Firm Characteristics‡
Ent Size (# of Emp) 584.4 61.8 - 76.2
State Owns Share 0.50 0.06 - 0.20
Russian Indiv Owns Share 0.56 0.91 - 0.70
Firm from Soviet times 0.59 0.09 - 0.40
Firm owes money 0.07 0.13 - 0.19]
Firm pays in kind 0.01 0.03 - 0.02]
Job Benefits‡
Paid Vacation 0.90 0.17 - 0.19
Paid Sick Leave 0.87 0.11 - NA
Paid Maternity Leave 0.79 0.07 - 0.17
Paid Health Care 0.24 0.01 - 0.05
Paid Trips to Sanatoria 0.28 0.01 - 0.03
Paid Child Care 0.05 0.01 - 0.01
Assistance w/Food 0.12 0.04 - 0.03
Assistance w/Transport. 0.12 0.03 - 0.01
Paid Educational Activ. 0.25 0.02 - 0.04
Assistance w/Loans 0.05 0.01 - 0.00
Obs 7192 815 204 158
Notes: The main data source is RLMS, round XVIII (2009). Definitions are the same as for table 2.
[From round 17 (2008). \From round 16 (2007). ]From round 14 (2005). ‡Only for those working for
firms or other organizations.
Table 14 shows that a large fraction for individual entrepreneurs
are in the managerial occupations. This is not a matter of labels only.
Table 3 shows that almost 40% of them has subordinates working un-
der them.27 All in all, this descriptive statistics confirm that informal
entrepreneurs and other forms of informal work are quite different and
should be analyzed separately.
According to the RLMS, almost 90% of non-enterprise individuals
work alone or with a few family members.28 Consequently, a number
27The average number of subordinates is relatively low, however. Conditional
on having at least one subordinate, informal entrepreneurs supervise 5.2 people,
while formal employees supervise 26.9.
28This information comes from round 17 (2008).
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of items in the adult questionnaire are only asked to individuals who
work for firms.29 First, respondents are asked about the size of the
firm. Table 3 confirms that informal employees work for firms that,
while larger than a family enterprise, are still much smaller than aver-
age.30 This is also true of individuals who are informal in the second
job.
Second, there are questions regarding firm ownership and origin.
The issue of informality and the shadow economy in Russia is often dis-
cussed in the context of the transition from the Soviet system (Johnson
et al., 1997, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). A familiar argument is
that the incipient capitalist sector makes use of informal arrangements
to escape confiscatory intrusions by the State. The data is consistent
with this story. The involvement of the Russian State in the economy
is very substantial. This is reflected not only in the relatively high
prevalence of state ownership, but also in the fact that almost 60%
of employment in Russia is still supplied by enterprises that originate
in Soviet times. Informal employment is, however, almost exclusively
provided by new private firms.
A third important set of questions touch on the issue of wage
arrears. Faced with a negative shock, firms in Russia often choose
to adjust via delaying the payment of wages (Lehmann et al., 1999,
Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011). Predictably, table 3 shows that
wage arrears and payments in kind happen relatively more frequently
to informal employees.
Finally, the RLMS asks enterprise workers regarding fringe ben-
efits. Paid vacation, sick leave, and maternity leave are mandatory
benefits according to the labor code and a large majority of employ-
ees claim to have them. However, many firms do not provide these
29The informal entrepreneur category is overwhelmingly populated (95%) by
self-employed individuals, so I do not present these statistics for them. However,
roughly 50% of informal employees work at enterprises.
30The median size of informal employees’ firms is only 10 workers. The median
for the whole sample is 50.
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benefits in practice. For example, only 66% of those employed had ac-
tually been on paid vacation in the previous 12 months, compared to
the 90% who claim to have entitlement. In any case, the proportion of
informal employees who are given the mandatory benefits is substan-
tially lower than average.31 Non-mandatory benefits are infrequent in
Russia, and almost non-existent for informal employees.
While informative, these questions provide insight into only a mi-
nority of informal jobs, i.e those which happen at firms or organi-
zations. Nevertheless, the RLMS includes a series of questions on
informal activities during the previous 12 months that are asked to
everyone. A summary of these items is in table 4.
Two points are noteworthy. First, nine percent of those employed
confessed having worked an informal second job in the previous year.
Reassuringly, the agreement with informality in the second job ac-
cording to my definition is almost perfect.
Table 4 – Informal Activities Last Year
All
Employed
Inf.
Employee
Inf.
Entrepr.
Informal
Sec. Job
Inf. Irreg.
Activ
Worked extra job 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.96 0.33
Raised cattle for sale 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.14
Agric. on own plot for sale 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14
Performed services for pay 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.61
Obs 7192 815 204 158 583
Notes: The data sources is RLMS round XVIII.
Second, almost 40% of individuals who perform irregular activities
live in rural areas. Not coincidentally, a significant proportion of them
are involved in small scale agriculture and husbandry. However, by
far the largest share of these activities involve personal services: taxi
rides, repair work, hair styling, tutoring, nursing, etc.
31The proportion of informal employees who had actually been on paid vacation
during the previous 12 months was only 8.6%.
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3.3 Compliance with the Law
Table 5 contains statistics based on answers to the INFSUP. An im-
portant cautionary note is that the INFSUP consisted of a stand-alone
questionnaire that was administered to all individuals who had any
form of employment. Respondents answered informality-related ques-
tions about two jobs (henceforth32 job-A and job-B). Unfortunately,
these jobs are not certain to correspond to those of the standard adult
questionnaire.33 I proceed as follows. I assume that the information
about job-A corresponds to the main job if such a job is present.
For individuals without a main job, I assume job-A must refer to (the
main) remunerated irregular activity. In fact, all statistics on informal
irregular activities are based on the latter group. Finally, I assume
that job-B refers to the secondary job as long as the individual does
not also perform irregular activities. This is the source of information
on informal secondary jobs.
A second issue is that the INFSUP asks a different set of ques-
tions regarding job-A depending on whether the individual is an en-
trepreneur or an employee. While for the most part individuals who
identify themselves as entrepreneurs in the INFSUP are also classi-
fied as such based on the adult questionnaire, the correspondence is
not perfect. I base the statistics only on individuals for whom the
classifications coincide.
A positive spillover is that the INFSUP provides us with some idea
of the composition of remunerated irregular activities. A stunning
40% of these workers consider themselves entrepreneurs.
Working under an oral agreement is strictly forbidden under Rus-
sian labor law. The INFSUP asks all employees in job-A whether
they have a written contract. This questions is important for validat-
32I reserve the terms ‘main job’ and ‘secondary job’ to refer to the adult
questionnaire-based categories.
33The most significant concern arises for individuals who, according to the adult
questionnaire, performed both a second job and irregular activities.
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Table 5 – Compliance with the Law
Sup for employees All
Employed
Informal
Employee
Informal
Sec. Job
Inf. Irreg.
Activ
Under oral agreement 0.11 0.69 0.81\ 0.96]
% Labor Law Compliace 83.1 52.9 NA 53.2]
% Contract Compliance 86.1 64.3 NA 65.5]
% of Inc Declared for SS 87.6 31.2 NA 10.5]
Obs 6453 777 80 186
Sup for entrepreneurs All
Employed
Formal
Entrep
Informal
Entrepr.
Inf. Irreg.
Activ
Unregistered 0.48 0.03 0.27 0.98]
% Labor Law Compliance 64.4 85.9 53.6 21.3]
% Contract Compliance 66.3 87.5 55.5 27.5]
% Formal Employees 64.0 85.7 53.4 8.3]
Contributes to SS fund 0.47 0.95 0.60 0.06]
Obs 397 64 194 126
Notes: The data sources are RLMS round XVIII and the supplementary questionnaire on informality
by the Center of Labor Market Studies, Higher School of Economics (2009). \Based on job-B answers
by individuals who do not perform irregular activities. ]Based on job-A answers by individuals who do
not have a main job.
ing my working definition of informality, since the adult questionnaire
only has registration information for enterprise workers in the main
job. Remarkably, over 97% of those who work under an oral agreement
according to the INFSUP are classified as either informal employees
or individuals whose only source of income originates in informal ir-
regular activities.
The supplement also asks employees about the extent to which
their employers comply with labor law and the specifics of the in-
dividual labor contract or agreement. These items are interesting
because registration is only one of the many mandates of labor law.
The average workplace has compliance levels well over 80%. Informal
workers report significantly lower levels of compliance. These figures
are consistent with the finding (table 3) that absence of mandatory
benefits and wage arrears are more frequent for informal employees.
Finally, employees are also asked about the percentage of their earn-
ings that is reported for social security purposes. In general, responses
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are very much in agreement with a similar item in the RLMS adult
questionnaire (table 2). Thanks to the INFSUP, however, we have
information on those performing irregular activities. Predictably, tax
compliance is extremely low for this kind of jobs.
The questionnaire for entrepreneurs provides information regard-
ing registration of business operations. In Russia, the self-employed
can either register individually or as a company. While some form of
registration is necessary to operate formally, it is unclear whether it is
sufficient. Practically all of the few formal entrepreneurs in the RLMS
sample are registered according to the INFSUP. Moreover, 64% of reg-
istrations are in the form of incorporated businesses. On the other ex-
treme, individuals performing irregular activities are overwhelmingly
unregistered. In between, a majority of those classified as informal
entrepreneurs in the main job are registered, but only 17% of them
have an incorporated business.
Entrepreneurs are also asked a number of questions regarding their
employees. On one hand, in formal firms labor law and contract com-
pliance is high, the share of informal work is low and contributions
to social security are very frequent. Informal entrepreneurs, on the
other hand, confess to much lower levels of compliance, specially in
the irregular activities sector.
Overall, the information in the regular adult questionnaire of the
RLMS and the INFSUP confirm that my working definition of infor-
mality is meaningful and that informal workers in Russia share many
of the characteristics documented in other countries.
4 The Tax Reform
In January 2001, Russia introduced a radical reform of its tax system.
The main components of the reform are shown in table 6. A number
of changes involved the personal income tax (PIT). Before 2001, the
PIT had a progressive scale with marginal rates starting at 12% and
reaching 30%. The new system fixed a flat and low rate of 13%. The
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reform touched other aspects of the PIT. The standard allowance was
slightly increased, from 3,168 to 4,800 rubles but now could only be
claimed by those earning less than 20,000 rubles. Also, the number of
permissible deductions and other loopholes was greatly limited.
Before the reform, employers were supposed to make separate con-
tributions –adding up to 38.5% of the gross salary– to four indepen-
dent social funds. The reform replaced this system with a unified
social tax (ST) with a regressive scale. It also eliminated the 1%
employee contribution to the social fund.
Table 6 – The Russian Tax Reform
Before (2000) After (2001)
Gross Yearly PIT ST PIT ST
Income (r.) Employee Employer Employee Employer
Control
<3,168] 0
1 38.5
0
0 35.63,168–4,800] 12 0
4,800-50,000 12 13
Treat1 50,000–100,000 20
1 38.5 13 0
35.6
Treat2 100,000–150,000 20 20
Treat3 150,000–300,000 30 20
Treat4
300,000–600,000 30 10
>600,000 30 2[
Notes: The data source is Russian Tax Code, part 2 (2001-2). ]The tax allowance in 2001 was only
available to those with income below 20,000 rubles. [Rate initially set to 5% and lowered to 2% in 2002.
Overall, the message of the reform was unambiguous. The govern-
ment was offering a new deal to the Russian public: lower taxation
levels and a more reasonable system. In exchange, it expected higher
levels of compliance. The response from the public has been widely
regarded as positive. Tax compliance improved significantly and gov-
ernment revenue increased despite the lower average tax rates (Ivanova
et al., 2005, Gorodnichenko et al., 2009).
4.1 Identification of the Tax Reform Effect
The combined effect of the PIT and ST reform can be seen in figure 5.
The tax reform affected the costs and benefits of informality faced
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by all economic agents. However, some groups were more affected
than others. Specifically, people earning less than 50,000 rubles per
annum had a net tax reduction of only 1.4%. In comparison, those
earning between 50 and 100 thousand rubles faced a reduction of 7.2%.
Finally, it is clear from the graph that the greatest reductions in tax
burden were received by those earning 100 thousand rubles or more.
Figure 5 – Combined Tax Burden
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Notes: Russian Tax Code, part 2.
The design of the reform created a natural experiment that can be
exploited to obtain a differences-in-differences (DID) estimate of the
effect of lower taxation levels on informality. Individuals earning less
than 50,000 rubles a year constitute a ‘control group’ whose marginal
tax rate remained practically unchanged. People with higher incomes
faced lower tax rates and therefore are considered ‘treated’. The DID
identification strategy assumes that the evolution of participation in
the informal sector for the control group can be used to estimate what
would have happened to individuals in the treatment group had they
not been treated.
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In practice, the determination of who belongs to the treatment
group is complicated by the fact that people misreport income in sur-
veys. Because tax rates were lower and regressive after 2001, it is plau-
sible that misreporting decreased (Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). There-
fore, the treatment group should be defined based on post-reform re-
ported income only. In the absence of misreporting, individuals with
after-tax monthly labor income above 3,625 rubles34 can be consid-
ered treated. If however income is under-reported, some individuals
will be incorrectly included in the control group. Thus, the result-
ing DID estimate is a lower bound of the true effect of the reform on
informality.
A second complication is that an individual’s income may be above
the threshold only in some of the post-reform rounds. I consider any-
one whose income is ever above the threshold as treated. The control
group is given by those untreated and employed in at least one post-
reform period.35
I report selected statistics on the control and treatment groups in
table 16 in the appendix. Over three fourth of the sample is in the
treatment group. In short, the treatment group is younger and has
less labor market experience, tends to be better educated, and is more
likely to be married than the control group. The households of treated
individuals are relatively more likely to be in urban areas, are slightly
larger, and have more members who are female or young.
5 Results
As a first step into understanding the effect of the reform, I plot the
informality time series for the treatment and control groups. Figure 6
shows that the reform probably affected informal employees. Before
2001, participation in this kind of informal work was approximately
34This threshold is obtained as follows: 3,625=(50,000/12)*(1-0.13).
35I offer a series of robustness checks to this definitions below.
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the same in both groups. However, their post-reform behavior was
very different. The prevalence of informal employees in the control
group experienced a steady increase. Informality among treated indi-
viduals barely increased.
While less conspicuous, this pattern is also present for informal
entrepreneurs (figure 7). Before the reform, informality was more
prevalent among the treated. By 2009, the control group had a higher
proportion of informals. Figure 8 shows that the reform did not seem
to affect informality in the second job. Finally, figure 9 provides com-
pelling graphic evidence that the tax cuts worked toward reducing
informal irregular activities.
Figure 6 – Informal Employees by Treatment
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treatment defined based on labor income in the post-
reform period.
These figures suggest that the tax reform was a success beyond
the realm of tax compliance. The reduction in taxation levels seems
to have pulled a large number of people into formal status. However,
there is some chance that the visual evidence is not statistically signif-
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Figure 7 – Informal Entrepreneurs by Treatment
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treatment defined based on labor income in the post-
reform period.
icant. More importantly, as shown in table 16, there are some marked
observable differences between the treatment and control groups. The
figures in the previous section do not control for any of these factors.
It is possible that the visual evidence is an artifact of spurious corre-
lation.
In order to obtain statistical evidence on the effect of the reform
and control for the possible confounding effect of observable charac-
teristics, I estimate the following DID equation:
INFit = θt +Xitβ + Ziγ + ψPostt + µTreati + α(Treati × Postt) + uit
(1)
where INFit is one of the informality-related dependent variables,
θt are time dummies, Xit and Zi represent sets of time-varying and
time-invariant individual characteristics respectively, Postt is a post-
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Figure 8 – Informal Second Job by Treatment
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treatment defined based on labor income in the post-
reform period.
reform dummy, Treati is the treatment group indicator, and uit is the
error term. The main object of interest is α, the DID parameter that
measures the average change in the probability of informal status for
the treatment group relative to the control group, conditional on all
the observables.
Table 7 presents OLS estimates of equation (1). I report Arellano
(1987) standard errors that allow for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation of arbitrary form.36 The main identifying assumption of OLS-
DID is that none of the unobservable characteristics that influence
informality participation are correlated with treatment status.
The results provide further confirmation that the tax reform re-
duced the prevalence of informal employees. On one hand, after con-
36This is one of the recommended approaches for DID studies (Bertrand et al.,
2004).
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Figure 9 – Informal Irregular Activities by Treatment
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Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treatment defined based on labor income in the post-
reform period.
trolling for all observable individual and household characteristics and
for any macroeconomic shocks absorbed by the year dummies, the ex-
pected probability of informal status for the control group was 8%
higher in the period after the reform. In contrast, informality grew
4% less among those facing lower levels of taxation. These estimates
are statistically significant despite the robust standard errors. Finally,
the coefficients for the control variables have the expected signs. In-
formality is less likely among women, Russian nationals, and high-skill
and married workers.
The effect of the reform on informal irregular activities is estimated
to be 7.2%. This is a very large effect considering that the overall share
of workers in this category was just above 13% in 2000.
As anticipated, the regression results also show that the effect on
informal entrepreneurs and informality in the second job was neither
economically nor statistically significant. I conclude that the reform
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Table 7 – The Effect of Tax Reform on Informality: DID OLS
Inf Employee Inf Entrep Inf Sec Job Inf Irreg Act
Household Characteristics
Number of Members -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0054*** -0.0033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of Female Members 0.0059* -0.0027 0.0018 0.0039
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Number of Youth, 18- -0.0090*** 0.0057** 0.0058*** 0.0129***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Number of Elderly, 65+ -0.0106** -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0050
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Urban Location 0.0043 0.0178*** 0.0045 -0.0228***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009)
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.0189*** -0.0161*** -0.0001 -0.0555***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Russian National -0.0096** -0.0106*** 0.0006 -0.0011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Age 0.0025 0.0087*** -0.0012 -0.0008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 0.0056** -0.0060*** 0.0006 0.0158***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience -0.0117*** -0.0043*** 0.0017*** -0.0111***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience2/100 0.0056** 0.0011 -0.0027*** -0.0048**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Secondary Sch Comp -0.0026 0.0053 0.0007 -0.0190***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
Vocat Sch Comp -0.0023 -0.0044 -0.0000 -0.0171*
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
Tech Sch Comp -0.0349*** 0.0021 0.0011 -0.0484***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
College Comp -0.0942*** -0.0077 0.0036 -0.0751***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Grad Level Comp -0.1270*** -0.0198*** 0.0224** -0.1244***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016)
Married -0.0248*** 0.0012 -0.0040** -0.0335***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
DID Estimates
Post 0.0774*** 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0089
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
Treat 0.0109 0.0072 0.0112*** -0.0049
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Treat×Post -0.0427*** -0.0060 -0.0010 -0.0722***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010)
Region Dummies[ YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies[ YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.1475*** -0.1544*** 0.0649*** 0.2299***
(0.042) (0.027) (0.017) (0.039)
Obs 44,452 44,452 44,452 53,769
R2 0.061 0.022 0.012 0.115
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Definitions are as in table 2. Arellano (1987) robust
standard errors in parentheses allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. Omitted
category is no educational degree. [Thirty-eight regional dummies, including Moscow and St Petersburg,
and nine year dummies were included but not reported. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
did not have a strong impact on these groups.
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The reduction in the share of informal employment among wage
and salary workers and those performing irregular activities could be
due to omitted variable bias. Specifically, it could be the case that un-
observable characteristics of people in the control group systematically
differed from those of individuals that were treated. The panel struc-
ture of the RLMS can be used to control for individual heterogeneity
by relying on within-individual changes only. The key identifying as-
sumption of the fixed effects model is that the effect of unobservables
is constant over time. Formally, this is stated by assuming that the
error term in equation (1) can be written as: uit = ci + it, where ci is
the constant individual heterogeneity and it is an idiosyncratic error
term with zero mean conditional on treatment, the other covariates,
and the individual heterogeneity.37 As is well-known, the price to be
paid for the robustness of the fixed effects estimator is that none of
the parameters of the time-constant regressors are identified.
Table 8 presents the fixed effects estimation results for equation (1).
The effect on informal employees is now estimated as -2.5%, while the
effect on informal irregular activities is -4.0%. Both results are still
statistically significant. Attenuation in the absolute size of the co-
efficients is a frequent occurrence with fixed effects estimates, since
within-individual variation is relatively more sensitive to measure-
ment error (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). I interpret these results as
indication that, while unobservable ability bias might be a factor in-
fluencing the OLS estimates, the tax reform indeed made informality
less desirable.
Rather than reflecting a real reduction in overall informality, the
results in this section could be illusory if the tax reform pushed indi-
viduals from one form of informal employment into others. To check
against this perverse case, I estimate the same equation for an index
of overall informality. The estimates in the third column of table 8
suggest that, if anything, the results for the detailed informality cat-
egories are conservative.
37That is, E[ | X,Z, Post, T reat, c] = 0.
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Table 8 – The Effect of Tax Reform on Informality: DID FE
Informal Employee Informal Irreg Activ Any Informal Employment
Household Characteristics
Number of Members 0.0010 -0.0088*** -0.0121***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Number of Female Members -0.0040 0.0083 0.0095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of Youth, 18- -0.0003 0.0112*** 0.0105**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of Elderly, 65+ -0.0100* 0.0005 -0.0011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Individual Characteristics
Age -0.0091 -0.0135* -0.0062
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012)
Age2/100 0.0130*** 0.0173*** 0.0213***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Experience -0.0025 -0.0048*** -0.0061***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience2/100 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Secondary Sch Com -0.0053 -0.0066 0.0037
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Vocat Sch Comp -0.0113 -0.0075 -0.0029
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Tech Sch Comp -0.0132* -0.0214*** -0.0174*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
College Comp -0.0276** -0.0394*** -0.0506***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Grad Level Comp -0.0321* -0.0704*** -0.0649*
(0.019) (0.025) (0.034)
Married -0.0086** -0.0098*** -0.0137***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
DID Estimates
Post 0.0495 0.0350 -0.0315
(0.099) (0.075) (0.119)
Treat×Post -0.0250** -0.0403*** -0.0584***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Year Dummies[ YES YES YES
Constant 0.2799 0.4481* 0.2996
(0.306) (0.232) (0.365)
Obs 44,452 53,769 47,718
# of Indiv 11,263 12,411 11,969
R2 Overall 0.04 0.03 0.01
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Any informal employment includes informality at the
main job, the second job or irregular activities. Other definitions are as in table 2. Arellano (1987) robust
standard errors in parentheses allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. Omitted
category is no educational degree. [Nine year dummies were included but not reported. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
5.1 Robustness Checks
In table 9, I present estimates of the tax reform effect under alterna-
tive specifications.38 I also provide estimates for all irregular activities
38To save space I omit all other covariates.
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(contractual or otherwise) and for informal irregular activities as ex-
clusive source of earnings.
In order to control for changes in characteristics at the regional
level –such as local tax enforcement efforts, financial markets, etc–
I add to the equation interactions between the 39 districts and the
year dummies. Including these additional controls does not affect the
results significantly.
Table 9 – Robustness Checks
Informal
Employee
Informal
Irreg Activ
Any Informal
Employment
All
Irregular
Activ
Informal
Irreg Activ
as Main Job
Baseline -0.0250** -0.0403*** -0.0584*** -0.0421*** -0.0343***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Including interactions -0.0246** -0.0337*** -0.0467*** -0.0373*** -0.0295***
District× Y ear (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Control group excludes -0.0256** -0.0408*** -0.0588*** -0.0427*** -0.0350***
unreported income (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Treatment defined using -0.0363** -0.0219** -0.0708*** -0.0339** -0.0219**
income from all sources (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011)
Treatment defined using -0.0183 -0.0455*** -0.0637*** -0.0514*** -0.0365***
2001 labor income only† (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010)
Treat× Trend[ -0.0063** -0.0148*** -0.0187*** -0.0159*** -0.0137***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Placebo Reform] -0.0008 0.0128 0.0251 0.0055 -0.0074
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.010)
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses
allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. “All irregular activities” includes
those done under contract. “Informal irregular activities as main job” excludes individuals with any other
form of remunerated work. †Excludes individuals who receive treatment in the late post-reform years
(see main text for details). [Includes a post-reform time trend (2000 = 1) instead of the post-reform
dummy. ]The placebo “reform” estimates are obtained by assuming that a similar change in the tax code
happened between rounds 8 and 9 (it did not). All other covariates are the same as in table 8. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
I also try a number of modifications in the definitions of the treat-
ment and control groups. First, I exclude from the analysis individuals
whose labor income is never reported, which under my baseline defini-
tion fell in the control group. Second, I define treatment based on an
alternative income item in the adult questionnaire. This alternative
includes income from all sources –some of them non-taxable– and is
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therefore not entirely appropriate to define treatment.39 Neverthe-
less, it is reassuring to verify that the main results hold with this
alternative definition.
The table also presents estimates when treatment is defined based
on labor income received during 2001 only. As shown in figure c
above, real wages were increasing over the post-reform period. As a
result, in my baseline definition many individuals enter the treatment
group late. It is possible that these “late comers” also had a higher
propensity to become formal and are therefore driving the results. To
guard against this possibility, I define treatment based on 2001 labor
income only and exclude from the analysis all individuals who receive
treatment (i.e. higher incomes) later. Under this specification the
estimate for informal employees is not statistically significant. The
effect on informal irregular activities is larger in absolute value than
in the baseline case and remains highly statistically significant. I
conclude “late comers” are not driving the main results. I further
investigate the robustness to “late comers” in the next subsection.
Another robustness test involves obtaining an estimate of the ef-
fect of the reform on the time trend of informality in the post-reform
period. This alternative specification implies a much larger overall
effect. For example, by 2009 the reform is predicted to have reduced
informal irregular activities by 1.5× 8 = 12%.
The final set of estimates in table 9 correspond to a placebo re-
gression. I (wrongly) assume that a similar tax reform happened some
time between rounds 8 and 9 of the RLMS. The new “treatment”
variable equals one if the individual is in the upper income brackets
(> 50, 000 rubles) in round 9. In the table are fixed effects estimates
of equation (1) using the latter treatment definition. As expected,
none of the estimates are significantly different from zero and most
39The question is: “What is the total amount of money that you received in
the last 30 days? Please include everything: wages, retirement pensions, premi-
ums, profits, material aid, incidental earnings, and other receipts, including foreign
currency, but convert the currency into rubles.”
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have the wrong sign.
5.2 Estimating Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
Using a Matching Estimator
The fixed effects differences-in-differences estimates seem to be robust
to minor changes in specification. However, there are a number of as-
sumptions underlying the estimating equation that are hard to relax
within this parametric setting. In particular, the fixed effects esti-
mates do not restrict estimation to the region of common support of
the independent variables between the treated and the control group.
In this subsection I use the matching differences-in-differences (M-
DID) estimator first introduced in Heckman et al. (1997) to estimate
the effect of the reform year-by-year. This semi-parametric estimator
allows me to check whether results are robust to changes in the func-
tional form of the control function, as well as to restricting estimation
to the region of common support. I also use the estimator to investi-
gate the sensitivity of the results to alternative definitions of the the
treatment group. The M-DID estimator is given by:
ˆMDID =
∑
i∈T
1
NT,t
[(INFi,t − INFi,2000)
∑
j∈C
W (i, j)(INFj,t − INFj,2000)]
(2)
where T and C are the sets of indexes for treated and control individu-
als respectively, and NT,t is the number of observed treated individuals
in year t of the post-reform period (t ∈ {2001, . . . , 2009}).
Intuitively, the M-DID estimator compares changes in informality
status between year t and the (pre-reform) year 2000 for each treated
individual to similar changes for a set of appropriate control indi-
viduals. Which individuals are selected as controls for each treated
individual depends on the weighting function W (i, j). The estimates
presented here use nearest-neighbor matching based on the propensity
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score.40
Figure 10 – Year by Year ATT for Informal Irregular Activities
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Notes: Reversed scale in y-axis. ATT obtained with a matching differences-in-differences estimator for
each post-reform year. Treatment defined based on labor income in years 2001–9, 2001–5, or 2001. The
I-beams are one-standard-deviation confidence intervals.
Figures 10 and 11 presents M-DID estimates (and one-standard-
deviation confidence intervals) for informal irregular activities and in-
formal employees respectively. For each year in the post-reform pe-
riod, the figures present estimates obtained when treatment is defined
based on labor income received during the whole 2001–2009 period,
when the period is reduced to 2001–5, and when only income in 2001
40Specifically, I used an average of the 10 nearest neighbors. I also experimented
using a kernel matching procedure (as in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd’s original
paper) but while the results were almost identical, processing times were much
longer. Therefore I stick to nearest neighbor matching. The propensity score was
estimated using a logit model that included all time-constant and time-varying
controls (as in the OLS regression of table 7). Matching was done on the index
rather than the probability. Estimates were obtained using Leuven and Sianesi’s
psmatch2 module for STATA.
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is considered.
Several points are worthy of note. First, the M-DID estimates of
the impact of the reform using the baseline treatment definition are
substantially higher in absolute value. The effect on irregular activ-
ities is estimated to have been −5.4% in 2001 and to have increased
thereafter. By 2009, individuals affected by the reform were 16.6%
less likely to perform informal irregular activities. For employees, the
reform is estimated to have decreased informality by 5.5% in 2002. In
this case, estimates do not trend upwards but neither do they wither
away in time.
Second, I check whether the time pattern of the effects is an arti-
fact of the treatment definition. I estimated M-DID estimates under
restricted treatment definitions. Restricting treatment to years 2001–
5 does not affect results. With the exception of a pronounced dip in
the effect on irregular activities in 2008, all estimates lay within the
one-standard-deviation band of estimates using the whole 2001-9 pe-
riod. Further restricting treatment definition to individuals treated in
2001 leads to a uniform downward shift in the time series of estimates
for informal irregular activities. Interestingly, the time pattern of ef-
fects is not affected, suggesting that the reform had significant long
run effects.
Overall, this experiment in this sub-section is interesting for three
reasons. First, it shows that the tax reform led to a reduction in
informality regardless of the time period considered either for defining
treatment or for measuring the effect. Second, the effect of the reform
is robust to a non-parametric specification of the control function and
to restricting estimation to the region of common support. Finally,
the time pattern of the effect was very different for informal irregular
activities and informal employees.
5.3 Detailed Treatment Groups
The tax reform affected individuals with annual earnings of 50,000
rubles or more. However, the effect was heterogeneous even within
42
Figure 11 – Year by Year ATT for Informal Employees
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Notes: Reversed scale in y-axis. ATT obtained with a matching differences-in-differences estimator
for each post-reform year (except 2001 when no registration questions where asked to employees).
Treatment defined based on labor income in years 2001–9, 2001–5, or 2001. The I-beams are one-
standard-deviation confidence intervals.
this group. In particular, as figure 5 shows, those in relatively higher
tax brackets experienced a larger reduction in marginal tax rates. It is
natural to expect that the effect of the reform was stronger for them.
Following this intuition, I define four detailed treatment variables
that distinguish among individuals with after-tax monthly earnings
in the following intervals: 3,625–7,250, 7,250–10,875, 10,875–21,750,
and 21,750+. I refer to these variables as Treat1 through Treat4 re-
spectively.41 Naturally some individuals fall into different brackets in
different periods. I operationalize the definition so that the groups are
mutually exclusive.42 I then re-specify the DID equation as follows:
41These detailed treatment groups correspond with the following tax brackets:
50,000–100,000, 100,000–150,000, 150,000–300,000, and 300,000+ (see also table 6).
42See notes to table 10 for details.
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INFit = θt +Xitβ + Ziγ + ψPostt +
4∑
h=1
µhTreat
h
i + (3)
+
4∑
h=1
αh(Treat
h
i × Postt) + uit
As above, I assume that the error term has the constant unob-
served effect structure, so I estimate equation (3) using fixed effects.
In table 10, I report the results.43
Table 10 – Detailed Treatment Groups: DID FE
Informal Employee Informal Irregular Activities Any Informal Employment
Post 0.0494 0.0358 -0.0298
(0.099) (0.075) (0.120)
Treat1×Post -0.0172 -0.0209* -0.0310*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Treat2×Post -0.0235* -0.0601*** -0.0768***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Treat3×Post -0.0267** -0.0501*** -0.0793***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Treat4×Post -0.0388*** -0.0276* -0.0390*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Obs 44,452 53,769 47,718
# of Indiv 11,263 12,411 11,969
R2 Overall 0.04 0.03 0.01
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treat4 are individuals with after-tax monthly earnings
above 21,750 rubles in any post-reform period. Treat3 are individuals with earnings above 10,875 rubles
at least once but never above 21,750. Treat2 and Treat1 are similarly defined using 7,250 and 3,625
rubles as cutoffs. The control group includes all those untreated and employed in the post-reform pe-
riod. Other definitions are as in table 2. Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses allow for
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. Covariates are the same as in table 8. All esti-
mated coefficients have the same sign and level of significance and are available upon request. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
For informal employees, the estimates follow a simple pattern. The
reform had the strongest effect in the highest income bracket. The ef-
fects on the other groups were still negative but smaller in absolute
43To save space, I report only the coefficients of interest. Other covariates have
the same sign and significance as in table 8. All estimation results are available
from the author upon request.
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value. Indeed, the estimate for Treat1 is not significant at the con-
ventional levels.
The pattern for informal irregular activities is nonlinear. The ef-
fect of the reform peaked among those in Treat2 and declined there-
after. One simple explanation could be that informal irregular ac-
tivities are infrequent in the highest brackets. Moreover, it could be
the case that informal activities are heterogeneous and that relatively
wealthy individuals only perform the most profitable among them.
Thus, it would take an ever larger reduction in taxes to lure these
individuals out of the informal sector.
An alternative explanation is that the reductions in the PIT and
the ST had different effects on this kind of informal employment.
As shown in table 6, reform-wise the difference between Treat1 and
Treat2 involved a reduction in the ST of over 15 percent. Meanwhile,
the difference between treatment group 2 and groups 3–4 was mostly
about the PIT.
5.4 Weighted Differences in Differences
The analysis of the detailed treatment effects suggests that the effects
of the reform may be heterogeneous. It also raises the concern that
the reduction in informal sector participation was endogenously deter-
mined, and not a consequence of the reform. Even though we control
for observable and (to some extent) unobservable characteristics that
differ across groups, it could still be the case that individuals in higher
brackets are somehow different in ways we fail to take into account.
Because the reduction in tax rates occurred in discontinuous jumps
at different income thresholds, it would in principle be possible to an-
alyze the effect of the reform in a regression discontinuity framework.
There are, however, not enough individuals in the RLMS to apply the
RD method meaningfully. An alternative approach involves weighting
observations by the distance of reported earnings from the threshold
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of 50,000 rubles.44 Specifically, the weighted differences-in-differences
estimand is:
n∑
i=1
ωi [INFit − θt −Xitβ − ψPostt − α(Treati × Postt)− uit]2 (4)
where ωi is the individual weight and I omit the time-constant re-
gressors. The weights are a decreasing function of the distance of the
individual’s post-reform income from the threshold at 50,000 rubles.
Specifically, given reported monthly income Yit, the weights are cal-
culated as K(Yit−3625h )/
∑n
i=1K(
Yit−3625
h ), where K(·) is a Gaussian
kernel and h is the optimal bandwidth.45 I interpret the resulting
weighted differences in differences estimates as robustness check in
the spirit of regression discontinuity, since individuals with incomes
close to the threshold are probably relatively closer in terms of all
unobservable characteristics.
Table 11 – Weighted DID with FE
Informal Employee Informal Irregular Activities Any Informal Employment
Post -0.0658 0.0245 -0.1852
(0.121) (0.063) (0.141)
Treat×Post -0.0178 -0.0329* -0.0546**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Obs 41,930 50,914 45,134
R2 Overall 0.005 0.03 0.001
# of Indiv 10,180 11,220 10,856
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Treatment effect estimated by a weighted fixed effects
regression. Included covariates are the same as in table 8. Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in
parentheses allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Table 11 reports the estimation results for equation (4) with indi-
vidual fixed effects. The estimates are fairly close to those in table 8.
44This approach was first suggested in Gorodnichenko et al. (2009). See also
Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2009).
45h = 0.9 σ5√n and σ is the smaller amount between the standard deviation of
reported income and the inter-quartile range.
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The number of observations goes down because of a number of indi-
viduals who are assigned zero weights, which is the intended effect of
the strategy. As a consequence, including the weights almost doubles
the standard errors of the treatment interaction term.
5.5 The Extensive Margin
So far, all estimates of the effect of the reform on informality have im-
plicitly relied on individual transitions in and out of informal employ-
ment. However, an alternative route through which the reform might
have affected informality is by changing the probability of choosing
a formal job for those that were unemployed before the reform and
found employment in the post-reform period.
Table 12 – Tax Reform Effect on the Extensive Margin
Informal
Employee
Informal Irreg
Activ
Any Informal
Employment
A. Baseline
Post 0.2740*** 0.4429*** 0.5704***
(0.093) (0.058) (0.114)
Treat×Post -0.0146 -0.1433*** -0.1355***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.027)
Obs 21,224 24,924 22,899
# of Indiv 7,339 8,080 7,709
R2 Overall 0.027 0.016 0.054
B. Robustness Tests
Including District× Y ear interactions -0.0111 -0.1467*** -0.1357***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.028)
Treatment defined using income from all sources -0.0314 -0.0948*** -0.1242***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.031)
Treatment defined using years 2001–2005† -0.0284 -0.1362*** -0.1044***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.033)
Control group excludes unreported income -0.0121 -0.1387*** -0.1310***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.027)
Treat× Trend[ -0.0007 -0.0212*** -0.0197***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). Sample restricted to those unemployed just before the
reform and who were employed at least once in the post-reform period. The dependent variable is set to
zero in round 9. Round 8 is excluded. †Excludes individuals who receive treatment in the late post-reform
years (see main text for details). [Includes a post-reform time trend (2000 = 1) instead of the post-
reform dummy. All other covariates are the same as in table 8. Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in
parentheses allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of arbitrary form. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
In order to estimate the effect of the reform on the extensive mar-
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gin, I restrict the sample to individuals who were unemployed in round
9 but found employment some time during the post-reform period.
The top panel of table 12 reports estimation results for the baseline
fixed effect specification. I interpret these estimates as the predicted
change induced by the reform in the probability of informal employ-
ment, other things constant, and conditional46 on finding employment
in the post-reform period.
The tax reform significantly reduced the probability of informal ir-
regular activities for new jobs. Specifically, individuals in the treated
group were over 14% less likely to choose this form of informal em-
ployment relative to the control group. The estimate for informal em-
ployment in the main job is negative but not statistically significant.
Finally, the effect on the overall informality indicator was similar to
that on irregular activities.
In the bottom panel of the table I report some robustness tests
(comparable to those in table 9). In general, the results reinforce the
message that the reform had a strong effect on the extensive margin
for irregular activities, while for informal employees the effect was
probably not significant.
46Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2009) study the effect of the reform on the ex-
tensive margin of employment in general (independently of formal status). Using
the same DID methodology, they find that the expected probability of finding a
job in the post-reform period was significantly higher for individuals in the treated
group. The estimated effect is between 0.09 and 0.14, depending on whether they
use a male or female sample. However, these estimates require extrapolating earn-
ings for individuals not employed throughout the post-reform period in order to
assign them to treatment or control. This is not necessary for investigating the
effect on informality, conditional on employment.
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6 Did lower taxes push people into formality,
pull them out of informality, or both?
The tax reform significantly reduced participation in informal irreg-
ular activities and, to a smaller extent, in informal employment at
the main job. In principle, the impact of the reform could have taken
two avenues: an increase in the relative flow of workers into formal
employment or a slowdown of the flow into informality. In this section
I try to assess the relative importance of each.
In order to consistently account for all labor market flows, I di-
vide workers into six mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories:
not-in-the-labor-force, unemployed, formally employed (either work-
ing for others or as an entrepreneur), informal employees, informal
entrepreneurs, and employed in irregular activities only (IAO).47 Us-
ing this classification, table 17 in the appendix reports overall patterns
of mobility in the Russian labor market between rounds 9 and 11 of
the RLMS.
The study of labor market transitions in a developing economy has
an important antecedent in Maloney (1999), which argued that pat-
terns of worker mobility are better than sectoral earnings differentials
for investigating the extent of dualism in the labor market. Maloney
argued that the different sectors of the labor market were well inte-
grated Mexico. First, he observed relatively high turnover rates in the
formal salaried sector, with an implied average duration (tenure) of
formal positions of 5.7 years. For the self-employed, average duration
was in the same ball park at 4 years. Second, he showed that —after
appropriate normalization— transitions into and out of formal and
47Informal employees and entrepreneurs are defined as above. The consolidation
of formal employees and entrepreneurs is due to the low number of transitions into
and out of the latter category. For the same reason, the IAO category includes all
workers doing irregular activities regardless of registration or official contracting.
The classification is based on the main job only, and so irregular activities done in
parallel with a main job are not taken into account in the classification.
49
informal positions were of similar magnitude. Together with other ev-
idence, these two points made a strong case against the dualist model
of the labor market.
Table 17 shows that the same methodology would lead to different
conclusions for the Russian labor market. First, the implied dura-
tion of formal sector jobs is much higher than that found in Mexico.48
Moreover, all of the informal sector categories have markedly lower
probabilities of permanence. Note this is not an artifact of the level
of aggregation (3 informal categories vs only one formal). Consolidat-
ing all informal categories gives a probability of permanence of 0.41
(implied duration of 3.37 years).49
Second, even after the normalizations50 suggested by Maloney, the
flows across sectors do not seem to lend support to the hypothesis of
integrated markets. In general, flows from the informal sector into
the formal sector seem more frequent than the reverse. Furthermore,
workers coming from non-employment seem to prefer the formal sector
over any of the informal alternatives.
The relative longer duration of formal jobs is even higher among
workers between 25 and 60 years of age.51 This suggests that, once
they have found a formal job, Russian workers rarely move to the
informal sector. All in all, Russian transition data does not seem to
lead to conclusions similar to those in Maloney (1999).
Table 13 presents the same type of transition data, this time dis-
48For each labor market state, this is calculated as 2/(1−pii) since we are consid-
ering transitions between rounds two years apart. Because we cannot considering
within-sector turnover, this is an estimate of tenure in the sector and not at a job.
49Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) find a similar asymmetry in the implied du-
rations of informal and formal sector tenure using two rounds of the Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (2003–4).
50First, we normalize transition probabilities between sectors by the size of the
destination cell (second panel of table 17). This makes flows in both directions
between two sectors comparable. Second, in order to make all flows comparable,
each cell is multiplied by the churning rates in the origin and destination state
(bottom panel).
51These results are not included to save space but are available upon request.
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aggregated into treatment and control groups as determined by the
flat tax reform in 2001.52 We apply the same normalization steps to
the disaggregated matrices, only that in this case we use the overall
terminal sector distribution and overall durations (from table 17) for
normalization.53 Conditional on treatment, it is still generally the
case that flows from informal and into formal status are larger than
the reverse. Also, workers coming out of non-employment seem to
prefer the formal over the informal sector.54
52More precisely, these transitions are a disaggregation from a subset of all tran-
sitions presented in table 17. The subset corresponds to individuals who were
employed at least once during the post-reform period and for whom, accordingly,
it is possible to determine treatment status.
53This is the correct procedure as long as segmentation does not occur across
treatment status.
54The main exceptions to these observations are flows into irregular activities in
the control group, specially for those that were out of the labor force in 2000.
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A very different lesson emerges by comparing the treatment and
the control groups: 1) Before the reform, the distribution of employ-
ment categories was quite different in the two groups. Conditional
on employment, treated individuals were more likely to have a formal
job. The tax reform operated to widen this gap significantly, specially
because of the marked reduction in the fraction of formal workers in
the control group. The same conclusion can be reached by looking at
the implied durations. Over 88% of treated formal workers remained
in the formal sector. Only 73% did so in the control group. 2) Every
flow (except informal entrepreneurs) into the formal sector is larger
for the treatment than for the control group. In particular, while only
17% of workers in the control group who performed irregular activi-
ties before the reform became formal, more than 30% of comparable
treated individuals acquired a formal job by 2002. 3) All flows (again
except informal entrepreneurs) moving workers away from the formal
sector were smaller for those treated by the reform. In particular, the
probability of moving from a formal job and into irregular activities
was halved for those facing lower marginal tax rates.
Overall, examining the flows resulting from the Russian tax reform
suggests that the pattern of transitions observed by Maloney in Mexico
is not a necessary condition for an integrated labor market. In Russia
workers choose among sectors and, when the underlying parameters
of the decision change, they change sectors accordingly. The evidence
suggests that sector choice is fairly stable unless major parameters
affecting the participation decision change. In particular, Russian
workers are very unlikely to leave the formal sector once they have
entered it.
The tax reform provided strong incentives in favor of formal em-
ployment. Consequently, workers in the treated group were less likely
to leave formal sector jobs, and more likely to transition from non-
employment or informality into formal positions.
53
7 Conclusions
The modern Russian economy is notorious for the high level of un-
certainty regarding regulations, the pervasiveness of corruption and
tax evasion, and the relative powerlessness of the State to enforce the
law. The economic and social costs of these institutional failures are
probably large. Unfortunately, there are negative feedback effects that
make the emergence of better institutions unlikely. Russia seems to be
trapped in low-level equilibrium of high informality and poor public
goods provision by the State.
In this context, the tax reform of 2001 appears as a highly im-
portant experiment. The reform reduced average tax rates for the
PIT and the ST and made the tax structure more regressive. Because
individuals in the lower income bracket were for the most part not
affected, it is possible to estimate the effects of the reform using a
DID approach.
In this paper I study the effect of the reform on individual partic-
ipation in the informal sector. I find evidence that the reform led to a
reduction in the fraction of informal employees. The reform seems to
have had an even stronger negative effect on the prevalence of infor-
mal irregular activities. These effects –which I estimate to be in the
order of 2.5 and 4.0 percent respectively– are robust to a number of
different specifications and small alterations in the definition of treat-
ment status. A semi-parametric estimator gives even larger estimates
of these effects. It also shows that the reform had long-lasting effects.
I also find that, predictably, the effects of the reform were relatively
stronger in the top income brackets, where the reduction in marginal
tax rates was more radical. Finally, the reform made it 14% less likely
that someone entering the job market in the post-reform period would
perform informal irregular activities.
I interpret these estimates as strong evidence that informality, at
least in Russia, is mostly a voluntary state. Intuitively, the decline
in tax rates reduced the benefits to being informal and, as a result,
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induced a significant fraction of individuals to migrate to the formal
sector. This kind of behavioral response would be impossible if peo-
ple were trapped in the informal sector due to the existence of entry
barriers. Moreover, informal employees and individuals performing
irregular activities are arguably the most vulnerable groups (at least
within the realm of people who have some sort of employment) in
society. If someone is trapped, they should be the ones. The two cat-
egories of informal employment that were not affected by the reform
–entrepreneurs and second job informals– constitute a small fraction
of overall informality and are certainly not among the most vulnerable.
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Table 16 – Summary Statistics by Treatment
Control Treated All Employed
Female 0.61 0.52 0.54
Age 42.29 37.18 38.21
Secondary Ed Comp 0.76 0.87 0.85
College Ed Comp 0.12 0.23 0.21
Schooling (Yrs) 11.07 12.16 11.94
Experience 20.12 16.26 17.04
Married 0.47 0.59 0.57
Urban Location 0.63 0.78 0.75
Russian National 0.63 0.73 0.71
Russian Born 0.92 0.92 0.92
Size HH 3.32 3.54 3.50
# Fem HH 1.77 1.86 1.84
# Youth HH 0.72 0.84 0.81
# Elderly HH 0.29 0.18 0.20
Obs 17,404 68,475 85,879
Indiv 3,545 11,487 15,032
Notes: RLMS, rounds VIII–XVIII (1998–2009). An individual is considered treated if her after-tax
monthly labor income from all sources is above 3, 625 rubles in any post-reform round. The control
group comprises the un-treated individuals who were employed.
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Table 17 – Mobility in the Russian Labor Market: 2000–2002
Transition Probabilities: [pallij ]
NILF U IAO I. Empl I. Ent AF palli· Implied Du-
ration
NILF 0.82 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.400 10.99
Unemployed 0.28 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.39 0.048 2.35
Irreg Act Only 0.32 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.03 0.23 0.055 2.76
Inf Employee 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.05 0.47 0.038 2.58
Inf Entrep 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.28 0.014 3.88
All Formal 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.82 0.444 11.34
pall·j 0.397 0.043 0.053 0.037 0.017 0.454
Incidence Matrix: [qallij = p
all
ij /p
all
·j ]
NILF U IAO I. Empl I. Ent AF
NILF 0.81 0.75 0.47 0.21 0.19
Unemployed 0.70 2.14 1.71 0.53 0.86
Irreg Act Only 0.81 1.55 1.80 1.95 0.52
Inf Employee 0.28 1.00 1.70 3.30 1.05
Inf Entrep 0.18 0.24 0.96 2.72 0.62
All Formal 0.21 0.68 0.49 0.74 0.72
Disposition to Move: [vallij = q
all
ij × (1− pallii )× (1− palljj )]
NILF U IAO I. Empl I. Ent AF
NILF 5.22 5.67 3.35 2.27 5.97
Unemployed 4.50 3.47 2.60 1.20 5.72
Irreg Act Only 6.18 2.52 3.21 5.22 4.05
Inf Employee 2.01 1.51 3.04 8.28 7.66
Inf Entrep 1.90 0.54 2.58 6.83 6.86
All Formal 6.46 4.52 3.81 5.40 7.94
Notes: RLMS, rounds IX and XI only (registration questions not present in round X). pallij is the fraction
of individuals in sector i that moved to sector j. palli· and p
all
·j are the relative sizes of sectors in 2000
and 2002 respectively. Implied duration is calculated as 2/(1− pallii ).
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3Слонимчик, Ф. Влияние налогообложения на неформальную занятость (на примере 
российской реформы по переходу к плоской шкале) : препринт WP3/2011/05 [Текст] / 
Ф. Слонимчик ; Нац. исслед. ун-т «Высшая школа экономики». – М. : Изд. дом Высшей 
школы экономики, 2011. – 64 с. – 150 экз. (на англ. яз.)
Налоговая реформа, проведенная в 2001 г., снизила средние налоговые ставки для 
подоходного и социального налогов, а также сделала шкалу налогов более регрессивной. 
Поскольку индивидуумы в нижней части доходного распределения оказались практиче-
ски не затронуты, для оценки эффекта реформы мы можем использовать метод двойных 
различий (differences-in-differences). Мы исследуем влияние реформы на неформальную 
занятость, которая определяется на основе данных о наличии трудовых договоров и о са-
мозанятости. Применяя параметрическую и полупараметрическую технику, мы получаем 
подтверждение тому, что налоговая реформа существенно снижает долю неформальных 
работников. Среди различных исследуемых нами форм неформальности наибольшее 
влияние реформа оказала на вероятность неформальной случайной занятости и на тех, 
кто испытал наибольшее снижение налогового бремени. Сильный отклик рынка труда 
на изменения в налогах свидетельствует о том, что формальный и неформальный рынки 
труда тесно взаимосвязаны.      
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